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I. INTRODUCTION 
Industry, like everything else, operates in a changing environ-
ment and is itself organically evolving with continual changes in 
structure and methods of operation. The attitude of the government 
should thus also be flexible in order to i'ope with these changes, and 
its role as a determining factor of market structure should be con-
tinually under review. 
On 1 January 1980, South African compel, it ion policy took a new 
direction with the implemenLation of the Maintenance of Promotion of 
Competition Act No. 96/1979. It would, therefore, appear appropriate 
to assess both the current legislation and its forerunner in an at-
tempt to discuss why the previous legislation could be regarded as 
having failed, and to evaluate the likelihood of success of the pre-
sent Act. 
In both the theoretical and applied parts of this paper, special 
emphasis will be given to the treatment of mergers in competition policy. 
There are two reasons for this. In the first place, recent studies1 
have shown that the major contribution to increased levels of concen-
tration has come from mergers rather than from the natural growth of 
firms. Secondly, from the practical aspect, it is far easier to main-
tain levels of concentration or deconcentration by inhibiting mergers, 
or by unscrambling mergers that have occurred, than by retarding the 
growth of firms or hiving off part of their activities in some way. 
This paper commences with an analysis, in Section 2, of the South 
African industrial structure and trends in concentration. In Section 3 
the theoretical aspects of competition policy are considered with a view 
to ascertaining whether economic theory can provide an indication as to 
the direction that competition policy should take. It also enables one 
to evaluate the legislation against a theoretical yardstick. 
1 See, for example, L. Hannah and J.A. Kay, Concentration in Modern Indus-
try, London: Macmillan, 1977. 
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Section 4 considers the previous legislation, namely, the Regu-
lation of Monopolistic Conditions Act No. 24/1955. The emphasis is 
more on its failings rather than on a detailed analysis of its various 
clauses. In Section 5 the new legislation is studied in some detail, 
with particular regard to the degree of success it is likely to achieve. 
This is followed in Section 6 by a brief examination of competition 
policy in certain other countries and a comparison of their approach 
with that adopted in South Africa. Finally, the main points which 
emerge from this study are summarised in Section 7. 
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2. INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA - GROWTH, STRUCTURE 
AND CONCENTRATION 
The aims in this section are to provide a brief historical sketch 
of industrial growth in South Africa, analyse the country's present in-
dustrial structure, and identify trends in industrial concentration. 
Growth and Structure 
The development of the modern South African economy may be divided, 
for the purpose of this paper, into four periods, the first being the 
agricultural phase from 1652 to 1870. During this period there was very 
little in the way of industrial activity; the small manufacturing sector 
which existed was related to agriculture and consisted of such trades as 
milling, tanning and wagon-building. 
The second phase lasted from 1870 to 1910 and may be regarded as 
being predominantly a mining era, with the discovery and exploitation 
of diamonds in the Kimberley area and gold in the Witwatersrand and 
Eastern Transvaal. Almost from the commencement of mining operations, 
the location of the minerals necessitated the employment of large amounts 
of capital which resulted in a high degree of concentration in the mining-
financial institutions which still dominate the industry. Furthermore, 
many of the materials, such as explosives and mine cables, required by 
the mines are fairly standard and this has led to a monopsonistic position, 
that is, only a few buyers, existing in several mining-related industries. 
A third phase lasted from about 1910 to 1933 and was characterised 
by growth in the manufacturing sector. The year 1910 has been chosen 
by economic historians such as de Kiewiet2 since it was the date of Union 
which heralded centralised political control and the establishment of an 
C.W. de Kiewiet-, A History of South Africa, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1979. 
adequate economic and transport infrastructure. An alternative date 
for the commencement of the third phase would be 1914; with the com-
mencement of World War I there was both an upsurge in demand for in-
dustrial goods and a certain amount of interruption in the shipment of 
goods from the United Kingdom which was at that time by far the largest 
supplier. These factors led to a sharp increase in local industrial 
production. 
The fourth phase, from 1933 to the present, marks the continued 
development of manufacturing to the extent that it is now more impor-
tant to the economy than mining and agriculture combined. Following 
the end of World War I in 1918, there was a relative decline in manu-
facturing as South African industry had once again to meet the challenge 
of European and American producers. The year 1933 is taken as the star-
ting point for modern industrial expansion. In that year, amongst other 
events, South Africa left the Gold Standard, and the Iron and Steel Cor-
poration (ISCOR) was established with public funds. The former event 
led to the re-establishment of investor confidence and the inflow of capi 
tal, while the latter was symbolic of the growth of the necessary indus-
trial infrastructure. Since then there has been a continuous process of 
import substitution for political, economic and, more recently, strategic 
reasons. 
Table 1 shows the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by kind 
of economic activity for selected years. 
Comparing 1920 with 1979, it can be seen that the main changes re-
late to agriculture, the share of which fell by one-third, and the 
'secondary industries' category which trebled its share during this period 
The relative decline in 'secondary industries' and 'services' in recent 
years can be ascribed to a large upturn in the mining sector. This up-
turn has in the main been due to increased prices obtained for gold and 
diamonds, but it has also been due to increases in mineral production. 
The mining sector how has about the same relative importance to the 
economy as it had in 1920 when 'secondary industries'was a comparatively 
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Table. 1 Percentage Distribution of Gross Domestic Product 
by Level of Economic Activity, 
1920-1979 
Activity 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1973 1976 1979 
Agriculture 22 14 12 17 12 9 8 7 7 
Mining 19 17 20 13 14 10 13 13 18 
Secondary (a) 
Industries 10 13 16 22 24 31 31 32 30 
Services (b) 49 56 52 48 50 50 48 48 45 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 ,00 100 
Notes: (a) 'Secondary Industries' comprises manufacturing, con-
struction and electricity. 
(b) 'Services' comprises wholesale and retail, transport, 
financial activities, community services, government 
and non-profit institutions. 
Source: South African Reserve Bank Quarterly Bulletin, June 1971 
and March 1980. 
Table 2 Gross Output in Manufacturing by Main 
Geographic Regions, 1972 
Region Gross Output (R 000) % of Total Output 
Pretoria/Witwaters-
rand/Vereeniging 4 436 312 47,36 
Durban/Pinetown 1 258 467 13,75 
Cape Town and 
environs 910 677 9,95 
Port Elizabeth/ 
Uitenhage 633 963 7,03 
Total ~ all 
regions 9 155 319 100,00 
Total - metropo-
litan regions 7 149 419 
1 
76,09 
Source: 1972 Census of Manufacturing: Statistical Year Book, 1978, 
Pretoria, Government Printer, 1978. 
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Concentration 
As regards the modern South African economy, it is characterised 
by high levels of concentration on a geographic, overall and industry 
basis. Geographic concentration is concerned with the extent to which 
industry is centralised in certain areas. Overall concentration is 
related to the concentration levels taking all industrial concerns into 
account, while industry concentration looks at the position in indivi-
dual industries. 
The four metropolitan regions produce an overwhelming proportion 
of the output, with the largest producing nearly one-half of the total 
output (Table 2). This type of concentration, like the others, is due 
in part to historical factors, a combination of population, skills and 
available capital ensuring that the Witwatersrand has a predominant 
share in manufacturing output. 
The overall level of concentration is also very high as can be seen 
from Table 3. In manufacturing, for example, it can be seen that the 
3 142 largest firms, which together constituted 25 per cent of the total 
number, accounted for over 90 per cent of total turnover in 1972. 
Table 4 shows the share of the largest companies in the total capital 
employed of quoted companies. As well as showing high levels of concen-
tration, the table also shows that, generally speaking, the level of con-
centration has been increasing in recent years. The 'continuously present' 
category shows those companies which were trading throughout the period 
and again, in most categories, the size inequalities have increased over 
the period. 
As regards industry concentration, individual industry levels are 
high as might be expected. Manufacturing is divided into 181 indus-
tries amounting to the five-digit ordering of the Standard Industrial 
Classification, and figures show that in 58 of these industries, the 




One must consider whether there are any special influences at work 
in the South African economy which would explain these levels. An im-
portant point to consider here is the lack of an effective competition 
policy in the past. Although this pre-judges to some extent the con-
clusions of Section 4, it is generally argued that the 1955 Act and its 
predecessors have been ineffective in the control of competition-reducing 
forces. Other concentration-inducing factors would include the high 
tariff barriers to exclude foreign competition, the small size of the ef-
fective demand for products, the long distances between the major 
centres and the historical factors which have been mentioned earlier. 
To conclude, therefore, it can be seen that the present-day 
South Africa has a large and growing industrial sector which is highly 
concentrated with correspondingly weak competitive pressures. 
3 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Regulation of Monopolistic 
Conditions Act No. 24, 1955, Pretoria: Government Printer, 1977, p.M 
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3. THE THEORY OF COMPETITION POLICY 
Governments must have certain guidelines in formulating their 
policies towards the organisation of market activity. These guide-
lines should have some theoretical justification in the sense that 
they should seek to evaluate what could be regarded as being the 
best type of organisation taking into account the aims of policy 
makers and the particular circumstances,if any, relating to the 
economy. It is questionable, however, whether guidelines can 
ever be suitable substitutes for legislation, particularly as 
they do of necessity carry the weight of clauses in an Act. The 
difficulty in formulating policies lies in the fact that there 
is no measure of agreement as to the various goals to be achieved 
or to the relative importance to be attached to the goals. The 
theory of competition policy is, therefore, difficult to evaluate. 
Swann states, for example: "it does not take very long to discover 
that not only is there no theory of competition policy; there is not 
even a coherent theory of competition". ** Nevertheless, at attempt 
must be made to formulate a basis for competition policy. 
In this section the intention is briefly to consider the role of the 
State in competition, and then to discuss different approaches to com-
petition. These approaches are not, of course, mutually exclusive and 
are, in fact, highly interrelated. 
The Merits of State Intervention 
Proponents of a laissez-faire type of economy are faced with a dilemma 
over the extent of the role of the State in mergers and the structure of 
industry. If the State prevents a merger from taking place, then this 
4 D. Swann, D.P. O'Brien, W.P.J. Maunder & W.S. Howe, Competition in 
British Industry, Londorc George Allen & Unwin, 1974, p.92. 
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(iii) Optimal amounts of output. This condition is concerned with 
securing an optimal allocation of resources. It will be met 
when the marginal rate of transformation (MRT) is equal to the 
MRS between the same goods. The MRT is the rate at which one 
good can be transformed into another by shifting resources from 
one to another. Symbolically this condition holds when 
MRT = MRS xy xy 
If they were not equated, some people could be made better off 
at no cost to others simply by shifting resources from one good 
to another. 
From Table 5 it can be seen that perfect competition yields an op-
timum position whilst monopoly does not. 
Table 5 Summary of the Extent to which Competition and Monopoly 
are able to Satisfy Optimising Conditions 
Optimising 
Condition Monopoly Competition 
Condition 1 Not necessarily satisfied. 
If the monopolist discri-
minates, then the ratio 
of marginal utilities 
will vary because con-
sumers face different 
price ratios. 
Satisfied - the price 
of goods is the same 
to all consumers and 
they are unable to in-
fluence price, so the 
marginal utilities of 
any set of goods will 
be the same for all 
consumers. 
Condition 2 Nor necessarily satisfied. 
If monopolist is also 
a monopsonist, then he 
can influence input price 
and MPPs will vary. 
Satisfied - producers 
will use combination 
of inputs with the same 
MPP ratios as the price 
of i-puts is the same 
for all producers. 
Condition 3 * Violated since MRS is not 
equal to MRT due to 
pricing which results in 
outputs have different 
price/marginal cost ratios. 
Satisfied - since firms 
equate the ratio of the 
marginal costs of the 
products with ratio of 
product prices. 
14 
This type of static optimality has, however, been attacked on a 
number of grounds. Lipsey and Lancaster's9 theory of 'second best' 
shows that if all the Paretian conditions are not present in part of 
the economy, then the level of welfare might fall if the conditions 
are created in other sections. The conditions can be compared, but 
it is not possible to reach a conclusion. 
A further problem inherent in a discussion of Pareto optimality 
is that of income distribution. As there is no general agreement on 
the ranking of different income distributions, one cannot compare one 
individual's gain with another's loss, and it is impossible to measure 
the changes in welfare for the community as a whole. 
These two problems do not cover all the limitations of the allo-
cative efficiency approach. It is sufficient to say that the difficul-
ties inherent in the approach are very great given the inevitability 
of non-Paretian conditions. 
Dynamic efficiency: This is concerned with the rate of technological 
change. If a high level of dynamic efficiency is achieved, then this 
might outrank other performance goals due to the effect of compounding, 
as higher growth percentages given a much greater product over time. 
Traditional economic thought as illustrated by Pigou10 and Hadley11 
has been that as the monopolist is by definition not subject to competi-
tive pressure, he will remain with the existing methods of production. 
More modern theorists such as Schumpeter12 and Galbraith13 argue 
9 R.G. Lipsey & K. Lancaster, "The General Theory of Second Best", 
Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 24, 1956, pp. 11-38. 
10 A.C. Pigou (ed.), Memorials of Alfred Marshall, New York: Kelley 
and Millman, 1956. 
11 A.T. Hadley, "The Good and Evil of Industrial Combination", Atlan-
tic Monthly, Vol. 79, March 1897, pp. 377-385. 
12 J.K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing 
Power, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. 
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that it is the large firms which possess greater resources and access 
to funds, and that the freedom from competitive pressures acts as a 
spur to innovation since the excess profits enable the larger firms 
to undertake the risky expenditure associated with innovative activity. 
As Galbraith14 states, "there is no more pleasant fiction than that 
technical change is the product of the matchless ingenuity of the small 
man forced by competition to employ his wits to better his neighbour. 
Unhappily it is a fiction". 
A number of studies, such as those by Horovitz15, and Scherer16 
and Comanor17, show a positive but mild correlation between concentra-
tion (as a proxy for monopoly policy) and innovative activity. In a 
review article Yamey states: "it is fair to summarise by saying that 
the positive relation between concentration and innovative activity is 
modest on a generous interpretation of the findings and that there is 
no firm supporting evidence for it on a stricter interpretation, and 
that any beneficial effect of concentration is likely to be exhausted 
before high levels of concentration are achieved".18 
Internal efficiency: If a firm is well managed, it will minimise costs 
for any given level of output. 'X-inefficiency' occurs when company 
managers relax, and is defined as the excess of actual costs over mini-
mum possible costs. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ira Horovitz, "Firm Size and Research Activity", Southern Economic 
Journal, Vol. 27, 1962, pp. 298-301. 
16 F.M. Scherer, "Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity and the 
Output of Potential Invention", American Economic Review, Vol. 55, 
1965, pp. 1097-1125. 
17 W.S. Comanor, "Market Structure, Product Differentiation and Indus-
trial Research", Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 81, 1967, 
pp. 639-657. 
18 B.S. Yamey, "Do Monopoly and near-monopoly matter?" in P. Peston & 
B. Cory (ed.), Essays in Honour of Lord Robbins, London: Weiden-
feld and Nicolson, 1972. 
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Leibenstein19 considered that X-inefficiency was more likely to 
occur in a large firm due to the lack of competitive pressures. A 
similar concept to X-efficiency is that of 'organisation slack' deve-
loped by Cyert and March.20 When large firms are not under pressure, 
they develop certain slack in the organisation which is only taken up 
when the firm is under some competitive or other pressure. The balance 
of evidence does, in fact, support the existence of both X-inefficiency 
and organisational slack in large firms.21 
Cost efficiency: Of all the arguments in favour of monopoly and the 
existence of a high level of concentration in an economy, the most per-
suasive and the most generally accepted is that of the existence of 
economies of scale. If it could be shown that the minimum efficient size 
of plant was of such dimensions as to exclude all but the largest firms 
in an industry, this would be a telling argument in favour of the exis-
tence and importance of economies of scale. This argument reached a pin-
nacle of popularity in the United Kingdom between 1966-1970 with the In-
dustrial Reorganisation Corporation whose primary function was to attempt 
to increase concentration levels in British industry by influencing the 
market mechanism so that industry could take account of existing economies 
of scale. 
Whilst there has been no doubt amongst economists since the time of 
Adam Smith22, with his famous example of pin makers, that economies of 
scale do exist, there is little unanimity as to what could be considered 
to be the ideal level of concentration in an economy. This is partly due 
to the difficulties in measurement as well as in separating and evaluating 
firm and plant economies. 
19 H. Leibenstein, "Allocation Efficiency vs X-efficiency", American 
Economic Review, Vol. 56, 1966, pp. 392-415. 
2 0 R.M. Cyert & J.G. March, A Behavioural Theory of the Firm.Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 36-38 and passim. 
21 See, for example, H.R. Edwards, Competition and Monopoly in the Bri-
tish Soap Industry, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 68. 
2 2 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, New York: Random House, Edition 
1937, p. 4. 
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Assessment of Performance Goals: In considering the attainment of per-
formance goals, one comes up against the problems outlined in the intro-
duction to this part. How, for example, does one both measure and weigh 
allocative efficiency gains for competitive industries against the gains 
to be achieved from economies of scale? Williamson23 has attempted to 
solve the problem with his trade-off model, but it would appear to have 
more theoretical than practical value. One is reduced to the 'on the 
one hand on the other hand' type of argument. An example of this 
is the British Green Paper Review of Monopolies and Mergers Policy which 
concludes its assessment of the various arguments as follows: "increased 
concentration can yield benefits and disadvantages. The benefits of 
greater concentration are, however, difficult to quantify. They include 
improved industrial efficiency, better international competitiveness and 
increased employment which all contribute to higher living standards. The 
disadvantages are equally hard to measure. In general, they are equiva-
lent to higher prices and as such reduce the welfare of consumers. To 
determine whether increased concentration is in the public interest, the 
advantages have to be evaluated and weighted against an estimate of the 
detriments to ascertain the net benefits. In some instances greater con-
centration yields few benefits and the potential to abuse market power. 
But equally, monopolists or oligopolists can be highly efficient and res-
ponsive to the needs of the consumer".24 In the light of the indeterminate 
conclusions which can be obtained from a study of the achievement of per-
formance goals, it is beneficial to study other concepts in the theory of 
competition policy. 
• Workable Competition 
This has been defined by Sosnick as "an attempt to indicate what prac-
tically attainable state of affairs is socially desirable in individual 
23 0. Williamson, "Economies as an Antitrust Defence: The Welfare 
Trade-offs", American Economic Review, Vol. 58, 1968, pp. 18-36. 
24 A Review of Monopolies and Mergers Policy: A Consultative Docu-
ment, Command 7198, London: H.M.S.O., 1978, p. 15. 
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capital markets".25 The concept was introduced by Clark26 and could 
be said to be based on the Chamberlinean27 view of the existence of 
elements of both competition and monopoly in market structure. In 
his explanation of workable competition, Clark might be regarded as 
the forerunner of Lipsey and Lancaster28 in propounding a theory of 
'second best'. He writes: "One central point may be put abstractly. 
If there are, for example, five conditions, all of which are essential 
to perfect competition, and the first is lacking in a given case, then 
it no longer follows that we are necessarily better off for the pre-
sence of any one of the other four. In the absence of the first, it 
is a priori quite possible that the second and third may become posi-
tive detriments; and a workably satisfactory result may depend on 
achieving some degree of 'imperfection' in these other two factors".29 
Although there have been a number of articles on workable compe-
tition giving different criteria of workability, Sosnick has asserted 
that there are three common groups of conditions.30 These are the con-
ditions of structure, conduct and performance. Sosnick emphasised the 
conditions of performance since these can incorporate the norms of the 
relevant policy makers. 
How far, then, does the concept of workable competition take one 
in search for a pertinent theory of competition policy? Unfortunately 
a consensus amongst economists would argue that the concept does not 
take one very far. As the criteria have to be stated in rather vague 
terms, they can appear tautological. For example, if one says that wor-
kable competition requires a large number of firms, this is similar to 
2 5 S.H. Sosnick, "A Critique of Concepts of Workable Competition", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 72, 1958, p. 380. 
2 6 J.M. Clark, "Towards a Concept of Workable Competition", American 
Economic Review, Vol. 30, 1940, pp. 241-256. 
27 E.H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1947. 
28 Lipsey and Lancaster, op ait. 
2 9 Clark, op oit} p. 242. 
30 S.H. Sosnick, op ait. 
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saying that workable competition requires a workable number of firms! 
A further type of criticism lies in the fact that there is no mecha-
nism for weighting the various norms or criteria so that it is diffi-
cult to assess whether or not the 'workability' of an industry has 
increased as a result of some curtailment of monopoly power. There are 
problems associated with this concept of workable competition which, 
taking everything into account, would not appear to make the concept 
suitable as an instrument of policy. 
Social Welfare Functions 
A basic premise in the consideration of government interference in 
market structure is its effect on social welfare. In other words, 
would social welfare be increased as a result of the implementation of 
anti-trust action? However, this in turn poses a further question, viz., 
how does one ascertain the value judgements on which one measures social 
welfare? 
One type of social welfare function which has been discussed in re-
lation to allocative efficiency is the Pareto principle. The difficulty 
with this type of function, however, as mentioned earlier, is that the 
principle cannot say anything about a change which improves the position 
of some while worsening the position of others. Since virtually all 
policy changes adversely affect someone either absolutely or relatively, 
the concept has very limited forms of practical application. 
Another social welfare function which Harberger31, amongst others, 
has championed is one which ignores the distributional effects of policy 
changes. It can be expressed as: maximise W = TR + S - (TC - R) 
when W = net economic benefit 
TR = total revenue 
S = consumer surplus 
TC = total cost 
R = inframarginal rent 
There are, however, various practical and theoretical problems to be con-
A.C. Harberger, "Three Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: 
An Interpretive Essay", Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 9 
1971, pp. 785-797. " 
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sidered in this and related functions when applied to anti-trust 
policy. On a purely practical plane it would be extremely difficult 
to obtain the necessary data to make any useful observations, whilst 
from a theoretical viewpoint it does seem erroneous to give the same 
weighting to producers and consumers and indeed to different classes 
of consumers. 
On balance, therefore, it would seem wise to follow the conclusions 
of Rowley on this concept: "We simply do not know enough about the working 
of modern advanced economies to be able to insert with any confidence an 
expression designed to take account of irremediable inefficiencies. Better 
by far in such circumstances to leave bad alone".32 
Per se Prohibitions 
An approach to competition policy based on non-discretionary rules 
has a number of appealing features in terms of simplicity and lack of 
ambiguity. This is the traditional approach to anti-trust in the United 
States and it escapsulates the belief that social welfare can be maximised 
by the maintenance and encouragement of competition by rigidly drafted 
rules. 
Although a per se approach is simplistic in terms of the lack of 
value judgments inherent in the concept, its practical implementation is 
a different matter. If, for example, there is a per se prohibition on 
four firms or fewer accounting for over 70 per cent of the market as pro-
posed by the Neal Committee,33 then one must determine how to define a mar-
ket or industry. This problem has never been satisfactorily solved and in 
practice the legislation has left it to the courts to provide acceptable 
definitions. A further problem lies in the determination of the levels of 
concentration which could be regarded as acceptable. 
3 2 C.K. Rowley, Anti-trust and Economic Efficiency, London: Macmillan, 
1973, p. 17. 
33 "The White House Task Force on Anti-trust Policy (The Neal Committee), 
reprinted in Journal of Reprints for Anti-trust Law and Economics, 
Vol. 1, 1969, pp. 663-826. 
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petition policy. A number of different approaches to the problem have 
been analysed with the final one being considered to'be the most suit-
able. This choice is not made with any degree of confidence in terms 
of either the degree to which it is an improvement on the other approaches 
or in the extent to which it represents original thought on the problem. 
Theory and practice are often, of course, inextricably entwined and it could 
be argued that a factor influencing one's choice of approach should be the 
probable effectiveness of the machinery for implementing the policy. If, 
for example, either the competition legislation or the implementing body 
was ineffective, then a per se approach might be preferred since this type 
of option, by definition, takes the discretionary element out of competition 
policy. 
To conclude, the everyday world is one which is dominated by oligopo-
lies, and comparison between perfect competition and monopoly can be con-
sidered to be redundant to some extent. What one must aim for, therefore, 
is to examine industry to see if competition can be made more effective 
in an oligopolistic structure, guard against abuses of monopoly power, and 
carefully monitor and control the further growth of monopoly power. 
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4. THE LEGISLATION OF 1955 
The main purpose of this section is to analyse the Regulation of 
Monopolistic Conditions Act No. 24 of 1955 (hereafter called the 1955 
Act). This Act remained the cornerstone of South Africa's competition 
policy for almost 25 years. In order properly to evaluate the present 
legislation it is necessary to study the 1955 Act in some detail and to 
consider the way in which it operated. 
Main Features 
Although South African competition policy could be said to have com-
menced with the Cape Meat Trade Act No. 15/1907, the first serious attempt 
to regulate monopolies was the Undue Restraint of Trade Act No. 59/1949. 
This Act was, however, of limited scope as the whole question of monopolis-
tic practices was being considered by the Board of Trade and Industries. 
The report of the Board,1+1 which was accepted in principle by the government, 
contained various policy principles which were incorporated in the resultant 
legislation, namely, the 1955 Act. 
The principle feature of the 1955 Act, and indeed of the present legis-
lation, is that it was an enabling measure. This means that the Act could 
not be contravened in that it did not forbid any type of structure or con-
duct. It merely established the framework for dealing with the problems. 
A further feature of the Act, to which reference will be made later, is 
that it only referred to abuses of monopoly power which had already occurred 
and could not anticipate the likelihood of the effect of any action. 
Under Section 2 the Act was deemed to apply when monopolistic condi-
tions had certain deleterious effects by restricting competition. These ef-
fects were: 
(i) restricting the output or disposal of any commodity; or 
(ii) limiting the facilities available for the production or 
distribution of any commodity; or 
Board of Trade of Industries, Republic of South Africa's Report No. 
327 of 1951, Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions. 
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(iii) enhancing or maintaining prices; or 
(iv) preventing the production or distribution of any commodity 
by the most efficient and economical means; or 
(v) preventing or retarding the development or introduction of 
technical improvements or the expansion of existing markets 
or the opening up of new markets; or 
(vi) preventing or restricting the entry of new producers or dis-
tributors into any branch of trade or industry; or 
(vii) preventing or retarding the adjustment of any branch of trade 
or industry to changing circumstances. 
The restriction of competition must take place as a result of one or 
more of these circumstances: 
(a) every agreement, arrangement or undertaking, whether legally en-
forceable or not, between two or more persons; 
(b) every business practice or method of trading including any method 
of fixing prices; 
(c) every act or omission on the part of any firm, whether acting in-
dependently or in concert with any other person; and 
(d) every situation arising out of the activities of any firm or 
class or group of persons. 
It can be seen, therefore, that for Section 2 to apply,a combination 
of circumstances had to exist. There had to be some monopolistic condi-
tion as defined under clauses (a)-(d) alone which restricted competition, 
and which caused one or more of the effects listed above (i)-(vii). 
Three separate parties were involved in the administration of the Act, 
namely, the Board of Trade and Industries, the Minister of Economic Affairs 
and the.Special Court. 
Section 3 of the Act laid down the main duties of the Board. It had 
the duty of undertaking investigations, but only under the direction of the 
Minister. If the Board came to the conclusion that a monopolistic condition 
existed, it then had to use its discretion as to whether or not such condi-
tion was in the public interest. If the monopolistic condition was thought 
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to be against the public interest, then the Board could, with the ap-
proval of the Minister, negotiate for the discontinuation of the condi-
tion. Section 6 laid down the measures which the Board could recommend 
to the Minister to halt the practice. These measures included the reduc-
tion of duty payable on imported goods in the particular industry and the 
declaration in the Government Gazette that such monopolistic condition was 
unlawful. Section 3 of the Act also laid the duty of supervision of the 
implementation of agreements and orders on the Board. 
The Minister had very considerable powers under the Act. As has been 
seen, he had the sole power to order investigations. According to Section 
6, he was also not bound by the decisions reached by the Board in its in-
vestigations and could overrule its conclusions. The Minister alone had 
the authority to order the Board to negotiate with the parties to terminate 
the monopolistic condition. The choice- of penalty under Section 6 was at 
the discretion of the Minister and if there was an appeal against his decision, 
it was his duty to deal with the administrative functions related to the ap-
peal . 
The Special Court was established to handle appeals from any firm af-
fected under Section 6. It consisted of a judge of the Supreme Court and 
two qualified members. The decision of the Special Court was final. 
Section 8 laid down penalties for contravention of the Act, in terms of 
failure either to provide information or comply with an order. The maximum 
penalty was a fine of R20 000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years. 
This section has considered the framework of the Act and the part played 
by the various parties. It has highlighted the key role of the Minister with 
his wide discretionary powers. 
The Act in Operation - An Evaluation 
It is difficult accurately to evaluate the 1955 Act or any other legis-
lation since it is very difficult to quantify all the ramifications. One can 
say with reasonable confidence, however, that the Act could be considered to 
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be a failure. This can be inferred for several reasons. In 1975 the 
government set up a Commission of Inquiry into the Act and as a result 
of the report of the Commission, the Act was superseded by the mainten-
ance and Promotion of Competition Act No. 96/1979 (the 1979 Act). A fur-
ther reason for the assumption of failure can be gathered from the Report 
of the Commission of Inquiry into the Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions 
Act No. 24/1955. The chairman of this Commission was Dr. D.J. Mouton who 
was also at the time a member of the Board of Trade and Industries and as 
such was closely involved in the working of the 1955 Act. The Report is 
highly critical of the 1955 Act and as there was no minority report, it is 
safe to assume that Dr. Mouton himself was also highly critical of the Act. 
The 1955 Act is analysed according to the following criteria: 
(a) an assessment of its structure and 
(b) an assessment of the way in which it was administered and the 
degree of success it achieved. 
This distinction is of necessity an artificial one since the performance 
of the Act will depend to a considerable extent on the adequacy of its struc-
ture. However, there are those features and failings of competition policy 
in South Africa which can be d irectly attributable to the structure of the 
Act whereas others are due to the way in which the Act was administered. 
Structure of the Act 
An important aspect of the legislation is that it could only deal with 
abuses after they had occurred. In other words, it was unable properly to 
evaluate the likely consequences of, for example, a merger; whilst the 
Minister had the power to dissolve a merger once it had occurred, the prac-
tical difficulties involved in restoring the status quo of the parties were 
so great that in fact the Minister's powers on this point were never used 
during the lifetime of the Act. 
A further weakness of the legislation lay in the fact that the Act was 
an enabling measure. As has been mentioned earlier, this meant that the 
Act could not be directly contravened and therefore a heavy responsibility 
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was laid on the Board of Trade in administering the legislation due 
to the lack of direct guidelines. This point will be returned to when 
dealing with the present legislation, but basically the lack of an exact 
definition of a monopoly, for example, in terms of market share, meant 
that it was difficult to establish criteria as to which industries should 
be investigated. 
As the Board of Trade could only act under the direction of the Minis-
ter, this added a further complication to the administration of the Act 
and was a contributing factor to the delays in reporting that arose. 
An additional criticism concerns the Special Court. Apart from the 
fact that not one appeal to the Court was made during the life of the Act, 
there is also a conceptual problem. Beacham1*2 has pointed out that it is 
strange that appeals should be made to the Special Court against a direc-
tive of the Minister since both points of law and a reassessment of the 
facts of the case would have to be determined. Beacham continues: "Anti-
trust cases are notoriously difficult, often involving value judgements 
and the balancing of economic effects which cannot be established with cer-
tainty or be easily quantified. But there seems to be no reason to suppose 
that a Court of Law is better equipped to decide these matters than an ad-
ministrative tribunal".43 
It would seem clear, then, that the 1955 Act had certain structural 
weaknesses which made it difficult for a successful competition policy to 
be implemented. 
Effectiveness of the Act 
This evaluation includes an analysis of the aims of the government in 
promoting the legislation and of the theoretical basis for the Act. An in-
sight into the aims of the government can be found in the words of the Minister 
of Economic Affairs when introducing the Bill: "This is not anti-monopolistic 
legislation. It is just a bill to regulate monopolistic conditions and it 
4 2 A.. Beacham, "Competition Policy in South Africa", South African Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 42, 1974, pp. 118-126. 
" Ibid3 p. 124. 
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appears very clearly from this, that even though a monopoly exists and 
even though combines exist, they can still be justified in South Africa 
if they do not have a deleterious effect on the public".41' 
The essence of the Act, therefore, as gleaned from its title and 
the Minister's statement, seems to be towards a policy of regulating or 
controlling monopolies so as to restrict or eliminate their harmful ef-
fects on the public. If one accepts that certain structures such as mono-
polies lead to certain types of market conduct, e.g., restrictive prac-
tices may lead to certain levels of performance like high profit rates, 
then there are various options open to the administrators of competition 
policy. They can try to affect the structural aspects, the conduct aspects 
or a combination of the two. 
As far as the 1955 Act was concerned, it would seem to have been the 
policy to ignore the structural aspects and to focus attention on aspects 
of conduct so as to provide what could be regarded as satisfactory perfor-
mance norms. One must then give further attention to what could be regarded 
as the harmful effects of monopolies and also to what constitutes the pub-
lic interest. 
If one reconsiders the deleterious effects of monopolistic conditions 
under Section 2 of the 1955 Act, which have been listed earlier, one could 
conclude that the main emphasis lay on the efficiency of production and the 
levels of barriers to entry since four conditions (namely iv-vii) relate to 
them. It is, of course, dangerous to reach conclusions on relative impor-
tance by number counting alone, but the concept of productive efficiency was 
emphasised in various reports of the Board of Trade. It has been written 
of the importance of economic performance: "the most important goals rele-
vant to the present investigation are the efficient use of the country's 
resources, the encouragement of progressiveness and innovation in the economy, 
the achievement of economic growth and a higher standard of living".45 
4 4 Hansard28 February 1977, p.1824. 
4 5 Report No. 1220M, para. 366, Board of Trade and Industries, 1967. 
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It would seem, therefore, that even if the same number of monopo-
lies existed at the end of the lifetime of the legislation as at the 
beginning, then this would not in itself be indicative of the failure 
of the Act, provided that the effect of these monopolies did not have 
deleterious effects on the public. 
Section 5, in fact, did lay down what these effects were. A diffi-
culty which arises in the assessment of the Act is in evaluating the ex-
tent to which these effects actually existed. For example, it is very 
difficult to quantify the extent to which monopolies are responsible for 
effect (iii) under Section 2 of the Act, namely, for enhancing or main-
taining prices. One way of evaluating the Act, which is adopted here, is 
to examine the reports of the Board of Trade in terms of their degree of 
success in regulating monopolistic conditions. 
Table 6 gives details of investigations upon the Minister's directives 
for the period 1955 to 1979. A study of this table shows certain things to 
be apparent. Firstly, the length of time taken to report: the average time 
taken to investigate from the date of directive to the date of report was 
over two years. This would appear to be due in part to the necessity to go 
through the Minister, but also in part to the conditions relating to the 
Board of Trade itself. The Mouton Commission reported that the Board of 
Trade was exceptionally busy during this period and that it lacked qualified 
staff. It would seem to be the case that these directives had a fairly low 
priority in relation to the other activities of the Board of Trade. 
One might conclude from a study of Table 6 that the basic industrial 
structure of South Africa was not touched by these investigations. It is, 
of course, difficult to define what is meant by the basic industrial struc-
ture, but a number of these investigations refer to relatively minor indus-
tries; out of a total of 20 reports, for example, three refer to local con-
ditions in Bloemfontein. A number of others refer to resale price mainten-
ance. Whilst it cannot be denied that resale price maintenance is an impor-
tant restrictive practice, it might not be considered so important in relation 
to a study of monopolistic conditions in various industries. If there are 
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Minister gave notice of his 
intention to ban the prac-
tice - Government Notice No. 
R. 1150 of 1968 
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dities except books, news-
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rol & tyres - Government 
Notice No. R.1038 of 1969 
Arrangement concluded with u> 
Building Industries Federa-
tion - Government Notice No. 
R. 1802 of 1970 
Arrangement concluded with 
buy-aid association (SAMBA) 
Government Notice No. R.1955 
of 1972. 
Minister requested the Mini-
ster of Finance to instruct 
tender buyers to report res-
trictive tender practices 
regularly in order to enable 
him to instruct the Board to 
investigate harmful restric-
tions in terms of section 
3(1) (a) of the Act 

34 
monopolistic conditions in an industry, however, the suppliers can in-
fluence both the price and the quantity at which they sell to the public. 
Comparatively few of the investigations, therefore, were concerned with 
monopolistic conditions in industries, and of these, a number were condoned 
as being in the public interest. 
A further feature which is apparent from a study of the reports is 
that there is of necessity a lack of continuity in the terms of the per-
sonnel employed in compiling these reports. This can be regarded as a fur-
ther disadvantage to employing enabling measures since different members of 
the Board may apply different criteria. An important part of the legislation 
(and indeed of the present legislation) is how one defines the public inte-
rest. Neither Act did, in fact, lay down a definition of what is the public 
interest, although one of the reports under the 1955 Act declared that the 
public interest should be judged according to the following criteria:46 
(i) the efficient use of the country's resources; 
(ii) the encouragement of progressiveness and innovation; 
(iii) the achievement of economic growth and a higher standard 
of living; 
(iv) the attainment of stability of price, production, distribution 
and employment of labour and capital; and 
(v) the avoidance of excessive economic concentration in individual 
industries and the economic system as a whole. 
An assessment of the success or failure of the Act might therefore de-
pend to some extent on a number of value judgements made with regard to the 
aims of government and to what constitutes the public interest. It might 
be argued, for example, that insufficient emphasis was laid on the interests 
of individual consumers. But if, as might seem the case, this was not an 
important feature of the period during which the Act was in operation, then 
any criticism should be directed towards the stated policy objectives rather 
than to the way in which the Act was implemented. 
Investigation into Restrictive Tender Practices in the Republic of South 
Africa. Report I475M, para 207, Board of Trade ot Industries, Pretoria, 
1973. 
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However, given the aims of the Act, and the fact that it had 
certain structural weaknesses, it is apparent that it was admini-
stered in an unsatisfactory manner. It is also apparent that the Board 
of Trade must bear prime responsibility for the implementation of the 
Act and that, for the reasons outlined earlier, it would not seem to be a 
suitable body for the implementation of competition policy. 
Summary 
It is not really disputed that the 1955 Act failed. The only diffi-
culty lies in apportioning the blame between the structure and operation 
of the Act. The importance of the distinction arises since the new legis-
lation was designed to overcome the weaknesses of the 1955 Act. 
It would seem that there were certain inherent weaknesses in the struc-
ture of the Act which make it impossible to operate successfully. In addi-
tion, the Board of Trade did not seem to be a suitable body to entrust with 
the administration of this Act, given its other duties. 
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5. THE LEGISLATION OF 1979 
The procedure adopted in the examination of the 1979 Act is similar 
to that in the previous part. An important difference, however, is that 
the 1979 Act has only been in operation since 1 January 1980 and so it is 
not possible at this stage to evaluate its performance. 
Structure and Administration 
As the Act does not give any real indication of the aims of the 
government, it is necessary to quote at some length from the speech of 
the then Minister of Economic Affairs when introducing the Bill in Parlia-
ment : "Our object with the Bill is to create more effective legislation 
in the interests of the business sector as well and especially for the 
presentation of the free market system which is the cornerstone of our 
country's economic life. It has never been the intention to disrupt, 
through the implementation of monopoly legislation, the economic growth 
and progress of the country in terms of the government's overall policy 
objectives. On the contrary, it is clear that a competition policy as 
envisaged in this Bill, wili be formulated and implemented with due al-
lowance for the country's broad economic policy objectives. It has al-
ways been the policy of the government to place a high premium on 
the preservation of healthy competition as a very important instrument, 
in fact as an important condition, for the proper functioning of the 
free market economic system in order to carry the country to new lengths 
of economic development".47 
One can deduce from the Minister's statement that the government is 
faced with the same problem as mentioned in Section 2, namely, how does one 
ensure the effective working of the free market system without the necessity 
of intervening to a considerable extent in the market mechanism? A further 
conclusion which could be drawn from the Minister's statement is that the 
1979 Act is similar to the 1955 one in that it appears to lay stress on eco-
nomic progress as a prime policy objective rather than on protecting the 
4 7 Hansard, 2 May 1979, p. 5427. 
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public at large from possible abuses of monopoly power. 
The history of the 1979 Act is relatively simple. A Commission 
of Inquiry to investigate the 1955 Act was established in August 1975 
and reported in March 1977. Two draft Bills were published in February 
and December 1978 before the final draft was laid before Parliament in 
May 1979. The Act was passed in July 1979 and came into effect on 
1 January 1980. 
As has been mentioned, the 1979 Act is similar to the 1955 one in 
that it is an enabling measure setting out the framework for the imple-
mentation of competition policy. 
The tripartite administration of the 1955 Act is retained, although 
there are important differences. The Minister of Economic Affairs and 
the Special Court are both retained in their previous roles, but under Section 
3 of the 1979 Act, the Competition Board is established in place of the 
Board of Trade and Industries. The Competition Board is an independent body 
although the President of the Board of Trade and Industries and the Regis-
trar of Financial Institutions are ex officio members. 
Section 6 of the Act lays down the duties of the Competition Board. 
This board has the power to initiate an investigation into a particular 
industry although the Minister van veto such an investigation if he con-
siders it to be against the public interest. The Board must also under-
take a continuous study of trends towards increased concentration with a 
view to the investigation of acquisitions. It must also issue guidelines 
to the public on the current policy on mergers. 
An innovation introduced in the Act involves the treatment of mer-
gers and acquisitions. As was seen earlier, the 1955 Act did not provide 
for the treatment of mergers except for the rather drastic and unused power 
of the Minister to dissolve such an acquisition. The parties to a merger 
or acquisition how have two choices open to them. They can approach the 
Board with the reasons for the proposed acquisition and try to obtain its 
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consent. Alternatively, they can go ahead with the acquisition with-
out any consultation. If the parties follow the first course of action 
and obtain the consent of the Board, then this consent will preclude the 
Minister from dissolving the merger at some later date. On the other 
hand, if the parties go ahead without consulting the Board, or go ahead 
despite a negative ruling from the Board, they then risk the Minister 
taking action to dissolve the merger under Section 14(1)C. 
One would expect that the Minister would use his powers of dis-
solving mergers far more readily than under the 1955 Act since parties 
to mergers which occur without consulting the Board, or against the 
Board's ruling,will leave themselves without grounds for complaint if 
their actions are subsequently set aside by the Minister. 
Under Section 16, financial institutions are excluded from the pro-
visions of the Act unless the prior approval of the Minister of Finance 
is obtained. This would seem to be a totally unnecessary restriction on 
the applicability of the legislation; no similar restriction exists in 
the competition policy of other countries and there do not seem to be any 
special conditions which would justify such a restriction in South Africa. 
One of the responsibilities of the Minister of Finance is to safeguard the 
stability of financial institutions. If two banks were to merge, it might 
be thought that the stability of the financial system would be increased 
with the consequence that consideration of the merger from the viewpoint 
of competition policy might be vetoed. 
One of the factors which led to the considerable delays under the 
1955 Act was that the Board of Trade and Industries could only negotiate 
with the parties after the report had been completed and handed to the 
Minister. Under Section 11 of the 1979 Act, the Competition Board can nego-
tiate at any stage with the parties concerned. This should lead to a spee-
dier and more efficient operation of the legislation. 
The role of the second of the parties concerned in administering 
the Act, namely, the Minister of Economic Affairs, remains fairly simi-
lar to that under the 1955 Act, except for the greater discretionary powers 
granted to the Competition Board which were not available to its predecessor. 
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The role of the third administrative body, the Special Court, remains 
the same as under the 1955 Act. The maximum fine payable has been in-
creased to R100 000 and/or five years imprisonment from the previous 
levels of R20 000 and/or five years. 
It can be seen, therefore, that the 1979 Act is a considerable im-
provement on the 1955 Act in terms of the approach to the implementation 
of competition policy. 
Will the Act Succeed? 
The preceding analysis would indicate that the 1979 Act is based on 
the 1955 Act with similar methods of investigation, enforcement and defi-
nitions of monopolistic conditions. The key question to be considered, 
therefore, in assessing the 1979 Act, is whether the changes will be suf-
ficient to make the new legislation a success, or whether the basic ap-
proach to the problem is flawed so that the 1979 Act will still not succeed 
despite the improvements. 
I take the latter view in believing that as the approach to the pro-
blem is wrong, the degree of success achieved by the legislation will be 
limited. The word success is, of course, purely relative and there is 
no doubt that the new legislation will be considerably more effective 
that the 1955 Act. I personally doubt, however, whether in the words 
of the Act, the legislation will be effective in "the maintenance and 
promotion of competiton". 
The fundamental criticism of the approach of the 1979 Act is that it 
is an enabling measure which leaves too much to the discretion of the Com-
petition Board. The competition policies of other countries are studied in 
Section 6 below and it can be seen that none of them take the South African 
approach to the problem. 
What, then, is wrong with enabling measures and what alternatives are 
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available to policy makers? As the Act cannot be directly contravened,, it 
places too great a responsibility on the Competition Board. This does not, 
of course, imply lack of competence in any way on the part of the Board, 
but that its task is likely to be too great. In other countries the legis-
lation makes the task of the administrative body easier by, for example, de-
fining monopolies in terms of market shares and forbidding mergers and res-
trictive practices unless they can be shown to be in the public interest. 
This does not mean that the alternative approach to an enabling measure is 
some type of per se approach to a particular type of structure or conduct. 
What it does mean is that certain industries are automatically referred to 
the administrative body in terms of their market structure, monopolising 
tendencies or some other statutory criteria. Without this structural approach, 
it is likely that the Competition Board will initiate its investigations in a 
somewhat haphazard fashion. Some of the investigations might result from com-
plaints from members of the public or trade associations, and others might 
be instituted by the Board itself; but it is difficult to escape from the 
view that no overall perspective of the economy will be considered in terms 
of the desired market structure or code of conduct. Over a period of time, 
therefore, a rather piecemeal approach might be realised with, to some extent, 
industries being considered separately and without reference to overall policy 
or desirable levels of concentration. 
It would seem that these dangers have been recognised by those respon-
sible for drafting the 1979 Act in that, under Section of the Act, the 
Competition Board must publish guidelines as to its policy on mergers and 
undertake reviews of concentration levels. It does not seem likely, how-
ever, that this will solve the problem entirely. Statements in policies to-
wards mergers as to what constitutes this public interest have, of necessity, 
to be couched in rather general terms and are, therefore, of limited use. 
Similarly, reviews of concentration levels are useful in showing the Board 
the trends in market structure but they do not indicate at what level of 
concentration or monopoly power an industry should be investigated. 
In addition, the statutory duty of the Board is limited to concentration 
levels and does not mention related profit levels. Without this infor-
mation it is more difficult to make judgements as to what the attitudes 
to increasing monopoly power should be in South Africa. 
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Apart from this qualification regarding the general approach to the 
problem, the 1979 Act is a considerable improvement on its predecessors. 
As the Competition Board can now be involved ab initio in merger consul-
tations, this will give both the Board and the Minister greater control over 
mergers and acquisitions. It is a pity, however, that a presumption 
against mergers is not made as is the case in other countries. This pre-
sumption would seem to be justified on the balance of evidence presented 
in Part 2: further, a large number of foreign competition policies carry 
this presumption. If it were to be included in South Africa it would 
make the task of the Competition Board easier rather than harder since 
the onus would be on the parties of the merger to prove their case before 
the board. 
It would seem rather surprising that the Special Court has been retained 
in a similar form as under the 1955 Act. Apart from the conceptual diffi-
culty mentioned in Part 4, the Court was not used during the 25 years the 
1955 Act was in operation. There does not seem, on the face of it, any 
reason why the Court would be used more extensively under the 1979 Act, 
and one might have expected that the concept of the Special Court might have 
been either scrapped or reconstituted in a way which would make it more 
relevant for the purpose for which it was designed. 
On balance, therefore, one would consider the chances of success of 
the new legislation to be much greater than that of its predecessor given 
the overall approach to the problem. 
Summary 
As the 1955 Act was regarded as a failure, policy makers had the choice 
of either adopting a completely new approach to the problem or of rectify-
ing the most obvious faults in the 1955 Act. The latter course was chosen 
and the provisions of the 1979 Act do, by and large, eliminate the faults. 
The establishment of the Competition Board, with fairly wide discretionary 
powers, will greatly speed up the process of investigation and reporting 
and strengthen the control of mergers. 
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However, the lack of a rigid structure or presumptions on such mat-
ters as mergers, might well lead to a piecemeal approach to the problem 
of competition which might be lacking in overall direction and continuity. 
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6. AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
The purpose of this section is to examine the competition policies 
of certain industrialised countries and to compare and contrast South 
African legislation. 
Features of Foreign Competition Policies 
As a generalisation, it can be said that competition policies in in-
dustrialised countries are stricter than the South African legislation 
particularly in three aspects, namely, mergers, monopolies and market con-
duct . 
Mergers 
These countries seem to have a strong presumption against mergers. In 
Australia, for example, mergers are forbidden if they result in a position 
of market dominance: the only exemption allowed is if the merger can be 
shown to be in the public interest. In the United States mergers are totally 
prohibited if the e'ffect would be substantially to lessen competition. As re-
gards the United Kingdom, mergers which are above a certain size or which 
would create a statutory monopoly (25 per cent of the market) are referred to 
the Monopolies and Mergers Commission for consideration. 
Monopolies 
A number of industrialised countries have statutory definitions of mono-
polies with certain levels of market concentration being automatically inves-
tigated by the appropriate authority. In the United Kingdom this level is 
25 per cent, in West Germany 33,33 per cent and in the European Economic Com-
munity under the Treaty of Rome, 40 per cent. Other countries, such as the 
United States and Japan, forbid monopolisation of industry, that is, the 




The competition policies of a number of countries declare certain 
types of conduct to be illegal. For example, price discrimination is 
illegal in Japan, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
One can see from this summary of these important aspects of competi-
tion policies that a number of foreign countries have a reasonably strict 
and rigid interpretation written into their statutes to be acted on by 
the appropriate authority administering the policy. 
Competition Policy in Certain Countries 
The United States, Britain and Australia have been chosen for our pur-
poses as a fairly representative sample of industrialised countries. In 
addition, policies obtaining in the European Economic Community are also 
considered. 
United States 
Fortas writes on United States competition policy: "Antitrust in the 
United States is not, in the conventional sense, a set of laws by which men 
may guide their conduct. It is rather a general, sometimes conflicting, 
statement of faith and economic philosophy, which takes specific form as 
the courts and governmental agencies apply its generalities to the facts 
of individual cases in the economic and ideological setting of the time. 
It is for this reason that both knowledge of the past decisions and a sense 
of the animating theory of antitrust are essential to understanding".1*8 
The United States has had for some time both strong monopolies and anti-
trust policies. The main statutes are the Sherman Act of 1890, and the Clay-
ton Act of 1914 as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 and the Celler-
Kefauver Act of 1950. The Sherman Act, and in particular Sections 1 and 2, 
has proved a cornerstone of American anti-trust policy. Under Section 1 
A. Fortas, "Foreword" in G.A.D. Nerle, The Antitrust Laws of the United 
States of America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. 
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every contract combination in the form of a trust or conspiracy in re~ 
straintive trade, was held to be illegal, while under Section 2 both 
monopolisation and attempts to monopolise were indictable offences. 
The other main pieces of legislation have served to specify certain 
of the contracts in practices mentioned in the Sherman Act. The Clayton 
Act declared price discrimination and exclusive dealing arrangements to be 
illegal where the purpose of effect was to reduce competition. The Robinson-
Patman Act was mainly concerned with defining price discrimination while 
the Celler-Kefauver Act extended control of mergers to include the acquisi-
tion of assets as well as shares. 
The responsibility for the implementation of legislation lies with the 
anti-trust division of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission. Both bodies are responsible for collecting evidence on suspended 
violation, but only the Department of Justice can institute proceedings. The 
courts have taken the view that certain restrictive practices are illegal 
per se, and mergers which lead to increased levels of concentration have 
been declared illegal even if it can be shown that economies of scale re-
sult. 
The American competition policy is important for several reasons, not 
just because of the political and economic importance of the United States, 
but also because the policies of countries such as Japan are based on the 
American legislative experience and those of countries such as West Germany 
seem to be strongly influenced by it. As a generalisation, it could be said 
that the competition policies of several other countries are moving towards 
the American type of solution of stricter rules and more of a per se approach. 
The United Kingdom 
The administration of competition policy in the United Kingdom rests 
with the Director General of Fair Trading, who is basically responsible for 
restrictive practices, and the Monopolies and Mergers Commission. The bases 
for the policy are the Restrictive Practices Act of 1956 and the Fair Trading 
Act of 1973. 
As regards mergers, certain types may be referred by the Secretary 
of State at the Department of Prices and Consumer Protection to the Mono-
polies and Mergers Commission for consideration. These cases are ones 
where assets of £5 million or more are required, or where a monopoly 
controlling 25 per cent of the market is created. If an investigation 
is ordered, it must be completed within six months and the decision reached 
must be based on the concept of the public interest which includes a num-
ber of factors such as the promotion of competition, industrial efficiency 
and innovation. Sutton49 has pointed out that the annual number of refe-
rences is about 2,5 per cent of the annual number of mergers and that about 
one-half of the merger proposals, in cases where investigation was 
ordered, were abandoned before the reports were finalised. 
As has been noted, a statutory monopoly exists where one firm has 25 
per cent of the market or where a number of firms acting collectively have 
a 25 per cent share. There is no presumption against monopoly, merely that 
at these levels the industry is investigable. 
In the case of market conduct, any type of restrictive agreement has to 
be registered with a number of conditions having to be satisfied before the 
agreement may be declared to be in the public interest. Recent discussions 
on competition policy in the United Kingdom have indicated that the policies 
are to be tightened still further with greater control over monopolies and 
mergers.50 
Australia 
The basis of competition policy in Australia is the Trade Practices Act 
of 1965 as amended. The Trade Practices Tribunal, together with the Commis-
sion of Trade Practices, is responsible for the administration of the Act. 
A whole range of restrictive practices are prohibited, including price dis-
C.J. Sutton, Economics and Corporate Strategy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1980, p. 107. 
See, for example, the Proposals in A Review of Monopolies and Mergers 
Policy: A Consultative Document, op ait. 
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crimination, exclusive dealings, restraintive trade and market sharing. 
If the market structures are altered in an anti-competitive direction as 
a result of mergers, then these are prohibited. Exemption will be granted 
by the Commission of Trade Practices only if it is thought that the pub-
lic interest benefits. There is no presumption against monopoly or mono-
polisation, but abuses of monopoly power as a result of control or dominance 
are prohibited. 
European Economic Community 
It is pertinent to indicate the competition policy adopted in the 
loose confederation of states which comprises the EEC. The aim of EEC 
policy is to ensure that there is fair competition between states and that 
the trade barriers which were eliminated by the creation of the common mar-
ket will not be replaced by other barriers erected by the private sector. 
The main legislation is contained in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome with these articles being administered by the European Commission 
whose decisions are binding, subject only to an appeal to the European Court. 
A major area of concern lies in preventing the isolation of particular 
national markets by the abusive monopoly power or by various restrictive 
practices. Article 86 prohibits any abuse of a dominant position within the 
EEC insofar as this may affect trade between member states. This abuse would 
include discrimination or conditions of supply or restriction of production. 
Article 85 prohibits all agreements which have as their object the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the EEC. It has proved dif-
ficult for the Commission to prevent the abuse of monopoly power because of 
the difficulty of defining dominance in a particular market. 
Up until the present time, the Commission has had difficulty in control-
ling mergers and is at present trying to increase its powers so as to con-
trol those mergers which would affect trade between member states. If these 
powers were granted, mergers above a certain size would have to be notified 
in advance to the Commission and would not be allowed to proceed if the re-
sult would be to hinder competition in the Common Market. 
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South African Policy Compared 
It is clear from this brief survey of foreign competition policy 
that, even with the improvements of the new legislation, South African 
policy is still weaker than that in operation in other countries. Weak 
in this context means that the legislation does not set out the conditions 
under which monopolies, mergers or restrictive practices are referable. 
The South African legislation also does not have any stated views on the 
desirability or not of mergers or increased levels of monopoly power. How-
ever, the general trend in South Africa towards the tightening up of con-
trol of competition policy is similar to that being pursued in foreign 
countries. 
This paper has studied competition policy in theory and practice in 
South Africa. As regards the theory, it is difficult to come to any firm 
conclusion due to the unsatisfactory state of the theory of the firm in 
the general field of economics. However, monopolies and monopolisation 
through mergers do have certain distinct disadvantages, and therefore be-
fore increases in monopoly power are allowed, the onus should be on those 
seeking to merge to show the benefit to the public at large from such mer-
gers. 
In South Africa the manufacturing sector is important and growing. 
However, the manufacturing base is still relatively narrow and the market 
limited. It is, therefore, clear that competition policy designed for 
large industrialised countries such as the United States or the United King-
dom, might not be suitable for South Africa which, by the nature of things, 
might of necessity have a monopolistic structure in a number of its indus-
tries. The act of building up an industrial base for South Africa involves 
the protection of domestic industries which further weakens the competitive 
process. 
The Regulation of Monopolistic Conditions Act of 1955, which was the 
cornerstone of this country's competition policy until January 1980, was 
relatively ineffectual due to deficiencies in the powers given to the Board 
of Trade and also to the way in which the Act was administered. But the 
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Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act 1979 is an improvement on 
the previous legislation as it gives considerable powers to the Competi-
tion Board and enables reports to be made more quickly and efficiently. 
As the theory of competition policy appears somewhat inconclusive, 
one must consider on what grounds the 1979 Act should be judged. One 
test would be to see how it compares with competition policy in other 
countries. Whilst the fact that other countries do, in general, have a 
stricter policy does not necessarily mean that the South African approach 
is wrong, since different countries have different problems, it does indi-
cate that it might be the 1979 Act which is out of step with modern thin-
king in this field. This Act does not give any presumption against mergers, 
monopolies or monopolisation, or any indication to the Competition Board 
as to the level of monopoly power at which abuse is likely to occur. One 
can, of course, recognise the difficulties encountered in making rules which 
are applicable to every industry, but in general this policy of indicating 
areas where abuse might take place, seems to work satisfactorily in a num-
ber of other countries. 
To conclude, therefore, it is obvious that the 1979 Act has rectified 
a number of the weaknesses of the earlier legislation. If the Competition 
Board issues fairly comprehensive guidelines as to the circumstances under 
which mergers and acquisitions might be allowed, then it might overcome to 
some extent the difficulty of operating competition policy in a non-struc-
tured manner. It might not be too harsh to say that Parliament abrogated 
its responsibility to some extent by leaving open such vital matters as the 
policy towards mergers rather than specifying them in the legislation. Al-
though -it is too early to judge the legislation, one has the feeling that 
its success might be somewhat less than it might have been if a different, 
stricter approach to the problem of competition policy in South Africa had 
been adopted. 
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